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This paper explores to what extent the new localism has effectively empowered Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and local communities to deliver localised, place-based 
enterprise policy at the subnational level. It identifies externally imposed constraints on local 
enterprise policy-making which have seen this reoriented towards the support of high-growth 
potential businesses. However, the scope and focus of enterprise policy at the LEP level 
contrast with heterogeneous local realities and needs, highlighting a pronounced rhetoric-
reality gap. With little evidence of local knowledge transcending policy boundaries, the paper 
reveals that the current arrangements constrain local agency and reduce the effectiveness of 
enterprise policy-making at the local level. It concludes that the power to develop localised, 
place-based enterprise policy exists only in rhetoric. 
Keywords: Localism, Enterprise policy, Entrepreneurship, Multi-scalar governance, LEPs, 
Local government 







Given entrepreneurship’s role as an engine of economic development (Acs et al., 2016), 
promoting entrepreneurship has become integral to economic strategies of governments 
worldwide. However, some have observed that contemporary enterprise policies have not 
yielded expected results. In the United Kingdom (UK), for example, despite three generations 
of enterprise policies (Beresford, 2015), there is little tangible evidence that the different 
initiatives have stimulated start-up rates or increased employment and economic growth 
(Greene et al., 2008; Huggins and Williams, 2009). Recent research shows that governance 
arrangements can be the source of challenges. Arshed et al. (2014) for example, demonstrated 
the ineffectiveness of UK enterprise policy under the governance arrangements of the previous 
Labour government and specifically critiqued the nationally conceived nature of policies. The 
transition to a ‘new localism’ over the last decade was conversely premised on a rhetoric of 
localised, place-based development and on empowering local actors to shape policy. However, 
recent evidence casts doubt on the promises of the new localism, raising important questions 
as to how much the enterprise policy-making process has actually changed (Arshed et al., 
2016). 
 The election of the Coalition government in 2010 was the catalyst for another change in 
UK’s geography of economic development governance as Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs) were abolished and replaced with LEPs, giving rise to a new localism (Pike et al., 
2015). Underpinned by a rhetoric of economic and spatial rebalancing through public-sector 
cuts and private-sector-led growth, LEPs set out to stimulate enterprise-led recovery by 
focusing on businesses with high-growth potential (HMG, 2010; Mason, 2016). This new 
devolution wave was heralded as a stepping stone in shifting power to local communities and 
ending the ‘Whitehall knows best’ culture (HMG, 2010; Pike et al., 2015). Localism aims to 
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stimulate local growth through LEPs (HMG, 2010; Pike et al., 2015) and empower local 
authorities and actors in the policy-making process. 
 Nevertheless, serious concerns have been expressed regarding the capacity of LEPs to 
perform locally inflected roles and to foster the horizontal coordination of local actors. Recent 
research has highlighted that LEPs are confronted with significant constraints on their ability 
to fulfil these roles such as insufficient resources, a lack of democratic accountability, a lack 
of engagement with SMEs and entrepreneurs and fiscal conditioning (Lowndes and Gardner, 
2016; Bailey and Wood, 2017). Such issues raise important questions as to whether devolution 
is empowering localised economic development and whether the new multi-scalar governance 
model is enabling a more effective design and implementation of enterprise policy at the local 
level. Bentley et al. (2010, p.536) went as far as arguing that “‘localism’ is an illusion since the 
LEPs will not have the necessary power or resources to carry out the tasks set for them”. With 
the local growth agenda driven by public expenditure cuts, the new arrangements cast doubt 
over the ability of LEPs to defend local interests in centre-local negotiations. 
 The devolution of power from the state to sub-national levels rests on the assumption that 
by bringing policy-making ‘closer to the people’ (Polverari, 2015, p.1075) the policies tailored 
to specific socio-economic realities would deliver better economic governance. However, these 
outcomes are also contingent on the configuration of multi-scalar governance that results from 
devolution and on the dynamics between actors at different scales (Arshed et al., 2016; Catney 
and Henneberry, 2016; Bailey and Wood, 2017). Specifically, they rely on the extent to which 
local actors are able to leverage their new and evolving position in the multi-scalar system to 
deliver meaningfully place-sensitive policy (Arshed et al., 2016). In this context, there is a need 
to better understand the governance dimension, the actors, and the processes within the overall 
enterprise policy framework in the newly devolved context.  
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 Drawing on lessons from the Sheffield City Region (SCR), the paper asks to what extent 
the new localism has empowered LEPs and local communities to deliver localised, place-based 
enterprise policy-making at the subnational level. The key objectives are to understand how 
enterprise policy is designed and implemented locally by LEPs, to assess the relevance and 
sensitivity of the new approach to local contexts, and to investigate what impact the new 
localism has had on the ability of local actors to influence strategic priorities and enterprise 
policy at the subnational level. The paper argues that externally imposed factors related to the 
austerity agenda and the national imperatives of promoting private-sector-led growth and 
maximising public sector investment have constrained local enterprise policy. These have 
limited the scope and focus of enterprise policy to targeting high-growth potential and 
ambitious entrepreneurs. The approach, however, contrasts with heterogeneous local realities, 
and the primacy of national priorities over local needs highlights a pronounced rhetoric-reality 
gap. Critically, while the rhetoric of new localism emphasises the empowerment of local actors 
to shape their economic strategies locally, there is little evidence of embedded local knowledge 
filtering into LEP-level enterprise policy initiatives. The paper reveals that the current 
arrangements constrain local agency and reduce the effectiveness of enterprise policy-making 
at the local level, resulting in intrascalar tensions between local actors. 
 The paper concludes that the new localism is an illusion (of power) as the new arrangements 
have failed to empower local actors and suggests that an obsession with scale hampers a more 
meaningful reorganisation of economic development governance at the subnational level, one 
that places the values and objectives of localism, rather than scale, at its core. While LEPs are 
specifically an English construct, their formation is situated within the wider UK devolution 
context which saw power devolved to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales in the late 1990s, 
and therefore the insights drawn from experience of the SCR yield important policy lessons for 
enterprise policy-making and the future of UK devolution.  
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Enterprise policy and the changing geographies of UK economic 
development governance 
The development of enterprise policy in the UK was influenced by the Bolton Report published 
in 1971, which highlighted the role of small businesses in building a dynamic economy (Arshed 
et al., 2016). Greene et al. (2008) distinguish four eras of UK enterprise policy, namely no 
enterprise policy, or ‘policy-off’ (1930s-1970s), small business policy focused on increasing 
the ‘quantity’ of enterprises (1980s), enterprise policy focused on ‘business quality’ (1990s), 
and the New Regional policy (NRP) which adopted a ‘balanced portfolio’ approach (1997-
2010). These are followed by the new post-2010 localist approach. Each approach was 
underpinned by different rationales for intervention and generated different economic 
outcomes (see Table A1 in Appendix A), as shaped by the changing geographies of economic 
development governance which, over the past three decades, have oscillated between localism 
and regionalism (Deas, 2014).  
Enterprise policy before LEPs 
Enterprise became a prominent vehicle for economic development in the 1980s as a response 
to the unemployment caused by industrial decline (Greene et al., 2008), and successive 
governments have since used it to promote entrepreneurship as an engine of economic renewal 
and growth (Curran, 2000; Williams and Vorley, 2014). Driven by the magnitude of job losses 
caused by deindustrialisation in the 1980s (Curran, 2000), the Thatcher administration shifted 
the focus from public-sector ‘dependency’ to an enterprise ideology with policy targeting job 
creation and increasing the business start-up numbers (Huggins and Williams, 2009). 
Nevertheless, small business support was expensive, the take-up was modest at best, and 
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economic growth was not markedly different during the 1980s, despite the sharp increase in 
start-up numbers (Curran, 2000).   
 In the 1990s the focus of enterprise policy shifted from ‘quantity’ to ‘quality’, targeting 
growth potential. This assumed that businesses with growth potential account for a higher share 
of job creation if supported to grow (Greene et al., 2008). Support included ‘softer’ methods 
such as consultancy, information and training (Arshed et al., 2016). A new initiative was the 
creation of Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) in England and Wales which facilitated 
tailored local support (Greene et al., 2008). However, TECs attracted criticism based on 
insufficient funding, democratic accountability, and business reach (Huggins and Williams, 
2009). 
 Following decades of centralism and persisting spatial disparities, a resurgence of 
regionalism occurred in the 1990s as a solution for achieving greater policy integration and 
regional accountability. The post-1997 UK Labour Government initiated what in hindsight was 
the first phase of devolution in the UK. This saw decision-making and policy delivery devolved 
to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, English regions and London, shifting economic 
development governance from the remit of local authorities to that of the newly established 
RDAs. Aiming to improve productivity, close the ‘enterprise gap’ between more and less 
prosperous areas and enhance social inclusion (Derbyshire and Haywood, 2010), enterprise 
strategies shifted again. Key initiatives included the Small Business Service, aimed to support 
enterprises of all sizes, and the Local Enterprise Growth Initiative, which promoted enterprise 
in deprived areas through a focus on removing barriers to entrepreneurship.  
 However, the approach attracted criticism for its excessive diversity, difficulty identifying 
cost-effective interventions, short-termism and lack of coordination between the new initiatives 
(Huggins and Williams, 2009). The complex, fragmented, unpredictable and weak policy 
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implementation process under RDAs (Arshed et al., 2016), the continued strong grip of central 
government, the high cost of business support (Derbyshire and Haywood, 2010), and a growing 
rhetoric of city-regionalism, led to the demise of RDAs and prompted a rethinking of 
subnational governance. 
 A key aspect that influenced the effectiveness of policy interventions was, however, the 
configuration of multi-scalar governance. RDAs were criticised for their inability to balance 
fragmented interests and provide a voice for their regions and for their dependence on 
Whitehall. Moreover, lacking power, resources and local engagement, local authorities became 
little more than ‘de facto agents of Whitehall’ (Morgan, 2007). Despite multiple attempts to 
‘fix’ regionalism (Ayres et al., 2018), this ultimately uncovered its centrally orchestrated nature 
(Ayres and Stafford, 2014). 
Enterprise policy under LEPs: a move toward the new localism 
The new Coalition government’s election in May 2010 marked the transition to a ‘new 
localism’. RDAs were replaced with LEPs which became the new governance vehicles for 
subnational economic development policy. LEPs were intended to reflect more functional 
economic areas, and thus to better represent local realities and set more relevant economic 
priorities (Bentley et al., 2010). As voluntary arrangements, the formation of LEPs resulted in 
different types of geographical configurations governing economic growth and enterprise. 
However, notwithstanding the lack of boundary prescription from central government, LEPs, 
predominantly in the North, were formed by unifying local authorities around the economic 
footprint of major cities—Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle 
upon Tyne, Nottingham and Sheffield. Thus, many materialised within a city-region 
geography, the preferred scale by central government (Ayres et al., 2018). 
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 Tasked with realising every place’s potential (HMG, 2010), LEPs are expected to bridge 
the national agenda with local realities by operating as multi-scalar constellations of actors 
acting together to drive local growth. While RDAs operated as ‘creatures of central 
government’, the narrative surrounding LEPs emphasised ‘freeing’ places from centralist 
control by shifting power to local communities (Bentley et al., 2017). In relation to enterprise 
policy, devolution marked a shift in rhetoric towards the greater promotion of place-based 
policies sensitive to local contexts. 
The new strategy privileges economic rebalancing through public-sector cuts and private-
sector-led growth. With the need to offset job losses from the recession and expected public 
expenditure cuts, entrepreneurship has been identified as central to economic rebalancing 
(Williams and Vorley, 2014). Thus, LEPs were tasked with providing “clear vision and 
strategic leadership to drive sustainable private-sector-led growth and job creation in their area” 
(HMG, 2010, p.13). Their main functions include enterprise and business support, investment 
in local economic infrastructure, employment and worklessness, skills, planning, housing and 
transport (Bentley et al., 2010; Bailey and Wood, 2017). The private-sector features 
prominently in the new strategy (Bailey and Wood, 2017) as LEPs are private-sector-led 
bodies. 
 However, under austerity, the new localism prompted yet another a shift in the enterprise 
policy approach. LEPs aim to simplify business support through enhanced growth targeting by 
focusing on businesses with growth potential (HMG, 2010). The main policy initiative is the 
Growth Hubs, public-private partnerships for business support delivery which are intended to 
act as growth catalysts by bringing together high-growth potential (HGP) businesses and the 
support network necessary to enable their growth (HMG, 2010). This approach involves 
business incubators and growth accelerator programmes designed to stimulate the growth of 
HGP businesses (Arshed et al., 2016), alongside Enterprise Zones (EZs) offering high-growth 
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businesses preferential treatment such as business rates and tax exemptions and access to 
multiple funding streams (Ward, 2016). 
 Nevertheless, enterprise policy literature levels several stands of criticism at the current 
approach. While the imperative to do more with less has meant that high growth firms (HGFs) 
have become central to LEPs’ strategies, Coad et al. (2017, p.538) emphasise that “it is 
notoriously difficult to pick out, ex ante, which firms will ultimately become HGFs”. This 
strategy also neglects that other types of firms are important and may merit public support. 
Morris et al. (2015) distinguish between survival, lifestyle, managed growth and 
aggressive/high-growth businesses and argue that, while high-growth firms can generate a 
disproportionate impact, each category plays a fundamentally different role, generating specific 
benefits for local economies. However, the different types of businesses also face different 
challenges and have different needs. Thus, it is critical that enterprise policy is sensitive to the 
nature of different business types and their unique challenges and needs, as well as to their 
operating context. 
 A key issue hitherto has been that enterprise policy initiatives are often largely based on 
policy-makers’ perceptions of what would be in the best interests of the business community 
rather than on the bottom-up involvement of stakeholders in the policy-making process. This 
issue is critical in the current governance context where LEPs are “required to address the needs 
of their local entrepreneurs and SMEs rather than delivering enterprise policy initiatives chosen 
randomly from White Papers” (Arshed et al., 2016, p.1602). However, such a place-based 
approach requires effective coordination of the constellation of actors both vertically and 
horizontally between spatial levels to enable the embedded local knowledge to filter into policy 
initiatives designed at higher scales (Barca et al., 2012). Bentley et al. (2017) highlights that 
this takes place within multi-scalar governance arrangements which are vertical, namely they 
extend across local, regional and national government, and horizontal, integrating the myriad 
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of subnational actors. Critically, the nature of such arrangements shapes the capacity and scope 
of local actors to influence and shape policy (Pike et al., 2015). Thus, it is essential that multi-
scalar arrangements foster cooperation and coordination to galvanise actors both vertically and 
horizontally (Arshed et al., 2016; Catney and Henneberry, 2016). Therefore, there is an 
argument to be made that the extent to which enterprise policy-making is localised and place-
based is contingent on the nature of multi-scalar governance arrangements. 
The multi-scalar challenge of enterprise policy-making 
Hildreth (2011) put forward three models that could unfold under the new localism. These were 
conditional localism, whereby the devolution of power and resources is conditional upon the 
delivery of outcomes to meet centrally prescribed priorities. Secondly, representative localism 
emphasises independence from central control and representativeness by placing local 
authorities at the heart of local governance. Thirdly, a model of community localism, whereby 
the devolution of responsibility from the centre to local communities emphasises direct 
community engagement. With the previous Labour government criticised for promoting a form 
of conditional localism, the rhetoric of new localism indicated a move towards a mixture of 
representative and community localism alongside a potential revitalisation of the role of local 
authorities in economic development (Walburn, 2011). 
 However, a closer examination of the institutional fabric of LEPs reveals some of the same 
issues for which RDAs have been criticised and disbanded. First, LEPs were established as 
private-sector-led unelected bodies, raising questions of local representation and democratic 
accountability (Bailey and Wood, 2017). Second, while the LEPs approach is predicated on 
autonomy and flexibility in setting priorities, they are constrained by the rigours of austerity 
(Lowndes and Gardner, 2016), leading some to fear that LEPs would be limited in their 
capacity to go beyond ‘steering and cheering’ and generate any real impact in their areas (Ayres 
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and Stafford, 2014). Lowndes and Gardner (2016) describe this as a devolution/austerity 
paradox as localities are expected to foster economic development with a fraction of the money 
previously invested in support through RDAs. 
 Another key issue is that of the discursive framing of political goals as the devolution 
narrative is dominated by arguments of improved economic performance and effectiveness of 
public service delivery which, despite the localist rhetoric, are closely aligned with central 
objectives (Bailey and Wood, 2017). Moreover, with LEPs required to compete in bidding for 
resources (Pike et al., 2015), the ‘value for money’ judgement continues to reside with central 
government (Walburn, 2011). This form of ‘fiscal conditioning’ is ‘centralisation by stealth’ 
(Bailey and Wood, 2017), reflecting the meta-governance of English devolution and continued 
central control (Bentley et al., 2017). Therefore, while LEPs are expected to foster multi-actor 
collaboration between and within governance scales, they operate under “a centrally prescribed 
and orchestrated framework” (Pike et al., 2015, p.201).  
 These issues cast doubt on whether the new localism has empowered localised enterprise 
policy-making and raise questions about the ability of local actors to reconcile objectives of 
local policy innovation with the realities of persistent central control. For example, examining 
the skills and employment policy in the SCR context, Etherington and Jones (2016) show that 
local actors face constraints in implementing nationally determined targets and programmes, 
highlighting that the general challenge facing LEPs is the adaptation of national imperatives to 
local conditions. Examining the translation of industrial policy at the regional and local level 
in the D2N2 LEP, Rossiter (2016) also highlights the challenges facing LEPs in developing 
economic strategies that reflect the needs of heterogeneous economic areas. Given a narrower 
focus on economic private-sector employment growth and a significant homogenising 
influence of national policy and funding streams, Rossiter (2016) questions the extent to which 
the rescaling of governance has actually enabled localised, place-based policy. 
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 Previous studies focused on enterprise policy-making have highlighted the challenges in 
the context of RDAs. Arshed et al. (2014) draw on insights from central government level, to 
demonstrate the power of central actors in dictating the focus and delivery of a top-down 
enterprise policy. Arshed et al. (2016) further highlight the complexity and confusion of 
enterprise policy implementation under RDAs characterised by fragmented relationships 
between actors, the lack of clear objectives, and little input from local actors tasked with 
meeting targets. Arshed et al. (2016) question how much these dynamics have changed in the 
current context given the LEPs limited powers to deliver enterprise policy initiatives and 
meaningfully engage with businesses. 
 Hence, there is a need to understand whether and how the enterprise policy process has 
changed under the promises of the new localism and LEPs. The overarching research question 
informing this study is ‘to what extent has the new localism empowered LEPs and local 
communities to deliver localised, place-based enterprise policy-making at the subnational 
level?’. 
Empirical focus and methodology 
This study focuses on the SCR LEP in the North of England. The LEP comprises nine local 
authorities and contains the major urban areas of Sheffield, Doncaster, Rotherham, Chesterfield 
and Barnsley. With Sheffield as the core-city, the SCR is part of the city-region-LEP nexus. 
The area was a major centre for coal, steel and manufacturing in the 1970s and following the 
decline in traditional industries it experienced a prolonged period of economic stagnation 
(Williams and Vorley, 2014). 
 Like in many northern regions, the SCR’s economic revival was largely premised on 
public-sector employment growth. In the 1998-2008 growth cycle, the SCR was the only city-
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region with a net decrease in private-sector employment (SCR, 2014) (see table B1 in 
Appendix B). As of 2016, public-sector jobs still accounted for 32.9% of all jobs in the SCR 
(Centre for Cities, 2018). This is problematic as the SCR is expected to experience 
disproportionate job losses resulting from public-sector cuts. This highlights the importance of 
stimulating private-sector entrepreneurship, expected to reduce the impact of job losses, while 
emphasising the need for effective design and implementation of enterprise policy across the 
localities. 
 The SCR LEP aims to transform the city-regional economy through major regeneration and 
growth projects (SCR, 2014). Its ambitious targets, set out in its 2015-2025 Strategic Economic 
Plan (SEP), include the creation of 70,000 new private-sector jobs and 6,000 new businesses 
(SCR, 2014). Business growth features among SCR LEP’s six key thematic priorities, along 
with Skills, Employment and Education, Housing and Infrastructure, Transport, Trade and 
Investment, and Promoting the City Region (SCR, 2018). However, there are significant 
challenges. One is the significant heterogeneity in business start-ups, with Sheffield as a core-
city outperforming the other localities, as well as in the survival of newly born enterprises 
across the area (see Table D1 in Appendix D and Table E1 in Appendix E). Moreover, SCR 
LEP ranks among the five least competitive LEPs (Huggins and Thompson, 2016), and is one 
the least economically resilient LEPs (The LEP Network, 2014). The challenging economic 
development context of the SCR highlights the need for localised, place-based policy and the 
relevance of the case study for LEPs in most need of economic development. In places like the 
SCR which have undergone industrial transformation and rely heavily on public sector 
employment, the issues facing LEPs are more trenchant than in other more developed areas of 
England. Thus, the SCR provides an appropriate focus for research into the impact of the new 
localism on enterprise policy-making at the subnational level. 
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 To explore this, we employed a two-stage qualitative methodology. First, we reviewed 
regional policy documents and reports relating to economic development to identify themes 
relating to the enterprise policy approach and focus. This also captured secondary data, 
providing a more comprehensive portrait of the challenges. Second, 67 in-depth interviews 
were conducted with five different groups of individuals: 7 with SCR LEP representatives, 10 
with local council officers, 6 chamber of commerce officers, 4 with business development 
managers, and 40 with micro-business entrepreneurs from across the SCR. The focus on the 
subnational level and the wide range of stakeholders interviewed adds depth and complements 
similar previous studies (e.g. Arshed et al., 2016). 
 In city-regional stakeholders’ case, a combination of purposive and snowball sampling was 
used, with a core group of respondents involved in economic strategy and policy delivery 
invited to take part, who then recommended other potential respondents.  Purposive sampling 
is widely used in qualitative research to ensure that specific categories of individuals 
possessing knowledge relevant to answering the research questions are interviewed (Rowley, 
2012). The approach ensured that the interviews represented the key stakeholders involved in 
city-regional policy. The aim was to develop a rich understanding of the enterprise policy 
process at the subnational level rather than just results that support the generalisability of the 
findings (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007). 
 Interviews were recorded with the respondent’s consent and transcribed before thematically 
analysing and coding the data to explore emergent themes. The interviews were coded 
following an open-coding strategy to ensure that potentially relevant insights are not 
overlooked (Gale et al., 2013). To ‘make sense’ of the interview data we used a constant 
comparative method involving coding the data while continually comparing new data with 
previous codes to identify recurring themes (Thomas, 2011). Initial codes were grouped based 
on similarity and revised and refined through constant comparison with the data and the key 
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literature, which yielded second-order concepts (Thomas, 2011). These were subsequently 
revised and labelled as the final themes. This approach ensured that the knowledge generated 
from content analysis “is based on participants’ unique perspectives and grounded in the actual 
data” (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p.1280). This coding scheme was applied by the authors, and 
the results compared to ensure inter-coder reliability. In many cases, there was consensus on 
key areas of exploration and these responses can therefore be considered representative of the 
views of the majority of the respondents. Given the political sensitivity of the research and the 
position of many interviewees in public office, participating individuals remained anonymous. 
Thus, LEP, local council and chamber of commerce officials are abbreviated to LEP, LC and 
CC, and business development managers and entrepreneurs are referred to as BDM and ENT 
respectively. 
Findings and analysis 
Three overarching themes emerged from the interviews: first, austerity and cutbacks have 
forced the LEP to focus on a specific type of entrepreneur; secondly, contrary to government 
rhetoric this strategy is not well-suited to local enterprise realities; third, the current multi-
scalar context constrains local agency, limiting the degree to which the SCR can pursue locally 
attuned growth. Each of these sections identifies externally-imposed constraints on local 
abilities to deliver place-sensitive enterprise policy and challenges the potential for localism, 
as currently configured, to yield expected policy benefits. 
Austerity shifts focus to ‘hunting’ ambitious entrepreneurs 
The SCR LEP economic strategy is built around entrepreneurship as an engine of economic 
growth and job creation. As local authorities lose their funding for local business support 
provision, the LEP has stepped up to ‘plug the gap’, designing new enterprise policy initiatives 
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to be delivered across the nine localities. However, as greater economic efficiency of public 
spending emerged as a key priority for public-sector intervention, austerity radically reshaped 
the approach to enterprise policy-making. A LEP official highlighted: ‘We won’t be able to 
support everything but support the things that are going to give us the biggest impact’ (LEP), 
as central government has made it clear that “greater prioritisation of Government support is 
required” (HMG, 2010, p.41). With enterprise policy expected to deliver more than ““lifestyle” 
businesses that have no aspiration to grow” (HMG, 2010, p.41), the LEP’s approach is ‘very 
much more about hunting the entrepreneur’ (BDM). Therefore, the LEP is taking a radically 
different strategic approach to stimulating private-sector growth than that of its institutional 
predecessors, moving away from the ‘any business will do’ approach (Williams and Vorley, 
2014) and instead focusing on stimulating ‘ambitious entrepreneurship’: 
‘Ambition is a fine line between somebody that wants to grow a business and be successful or 
somebody that want to be successful and have enough money to have a nice lifestyle, and what we 
need to do is identify those that are looking to be successful and grow a successful business and not 
the lifestyle businesses.’ (LEP) 
 Departing from decades of small business policy, the new approach focuses on HGP 
businesses and places entrepreneurial ambition at the core of support provision. This strategic 
shift has direct implications for the focus and extent of business support available through the 
LEP, with support being directly proportional to the businesses’ level of ambition: 
‘Every entrepreneur gets the support they need to start their business but the more ambition they 
have the more support they get … It’s fine if they want to start a business … but if they’ve got no 
ambition to grow beyond that then there’s not much more we can do for them.’ (LEP) 
 17 
Long-term planning in enterprise policy implementation has also been impacted by the 
pressure to ‘do more with less’ (Lowndes and Gardner, 2016). The reform of subnational 
governance has seen not only responsibility for strategy formulation shifting to city-regional 
actors but also the actual delivery of enterprise support, with support provision gradually 
concentrating within the LEP’s remit. Thus, the LEP has developed a number of programmes 
to support businesses with the view that ‘over the next five years the support through [the 
councils] will be ramped down gradually to the point where all of the support delivered will be 
delivered by the Growth Hub.’ (LEP). Nevertheless, while the localist rhetoric was premised 
on place-based development and the empowerment of local actors to shape policy, the 
interviews revealed that enterprise policy-making did not embed such attributes, highlighting 
a rhetoric-reality gap (Ayres et al., 2018). 
The rhetoric-reality gap: national priorities clash with local realities 
Etherington and Jones (2016) emphasise that, given the tension between the devolution of 
responsibilities for policy formulation and the requirement for local actors to implement 
nationally determined targets and programmes, the key challenge is the adaptation of national 
priorities to local conditions. However, the interviews revealed that the centrally-established 
LEPs’ enterprise policy approach contrasts with the business realities in many of the 
constituting localities – particularly with respect to business sizes and target sectors. 
 Many interviewees highlighted the overemphasis on targeting HGP businesses, which 
creates a few winners in the form of larger businesses with the largest economic potential and 
many losers, namely the smaller, particularly micro-businesses. A local stakeholder 
emphasised: ‘I think there’s almost this sort of demonization of this type of businesses when 
actually it’s our real economy’ (CC).  This is indeed reinforced by statistical data on the size 
distribution of businesses in the SCR (see Table C1 in Appendix C). The rhetoric at the LEP 
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level, however, is not explicit in terms of targeting larger businesses, with initiatives available 
to all businesses regardless of size. The SEP states ‘every business matters’ (SCR, 2014), and 
officials note: ‘Our approach going forward is meeting the needs of businesses. It shouldn’t 
matter what size they are for state aid purposes’ (LEP). 
Nevertheless, economic growth and job creation are key objectives, and since larger 
businesses possess a larger potential in this regard, the new initiatives inadvertently, if not 
wittingly, filter out smaller businesses. In fact, a LEP official explained that ‘for us, for the 
City Regions, our policy is aimed at small, 10-employee and bigger businesses’ (LEP). The 
implication is that, for support purposes, some businesses do matter more than others. Such 
targeting is also expected to impact the distribution of support across the city-region, with 
Sheffield being home to highest number of businesses with at least 10 employees when 
compared to the other constituent localities (see table C1 in Appendix C). Moreover, the 
initiatives are geared towards promoting growth in particular sectors, thereby also ‘cherry-
picking’ the type of growth closer aligned with the city-regional economic strategy. For 
example, Accelerator programmes target businesses in the technology and creative and digital 
industries ‘with the idea to identify specific, very high-growth businesses’ (LEP). 
Therefore, despite issues with ‘picking winners’ (Coad et al., 2017), this approach reflects 
a continued focus on ‘cherry picking’ sectors and the benefits of more productive businesses 
(Morris et al., 2015). This is problematic for many of the localities in the SCR, especially those 
peripheral to the core-city of Sheffield, where high-growth businesses are generally scarcer 
(Mason, 2016). One interviewee noted that small and micro-businesses are ‘the backbone of 
[the local economy]’ (S2). This demonstrates a divergence between local and city-regional 
priorities: 
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‘Not to criticise the LEP but they’re obviously focusing around growth and growth businesses, and 
probably larger [businesses] and SMEs, which is great, but again, you’re talking very small numbers 
there and actually the micro firms make up the bigger landscape, so I think maybe there needs to 
be a bit more of a priority shift.’ (BDM) 
There is also a perception among local small and micro-business entrepreneurs that it is the 
voice of larger businesses that is represented at the policy level, as micro-businesses tend to 
get forgotten despite being a large part of the economy: 
‘They definitely tend to focus on the more medium, 50 to 200 [employee businesses]. It’s all about 
people that have got employees … but I don’t think they realise that there’s quite a growing 
economy of people that just want to work with themselves or employ 1 or 2 others.’ (ENT) 
As Gherhes et al. (2016) highlight, micro-businesses are owner-manager-entrepreneur-
centric, thus facing different challenges and having specific support needs not generally served 
by programmes aimed at HGP businesses. However, LEP initiatives are limited and include 
the Y Accelerator program specifically targeting HGP businesses and the Launchpad aimed at 
pre-start, new businesses and SMEs trading for less than 2 years (SCR Growth Hub, 2017). A 
key issue here is also the lack of post-start-up support, especially given the heterogeneity and 
lower levels of long-term survival rates of newly born enterprises in the city-region (see table 
E1 in Appendix E). Importantly, the effects of such initiatives have filtered down into the local 
business communities, with many small and micro-businesses feeling left out by the new 
initiatives. One entrepreneur highlighted that ‘as a small business you’re a bit of an 
afterthought’ (ENT), while another stated ‘you feel isolated, perhaps a bit like the underdog’ 
(ENT). The lack of voice and representation is a key issue, with one entrepreneur stating: ‘the 
voice of the small business owners doesn’t get across regionally or to central government’ 
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(ENT). Others mentioned that they were sometimes unable to access support due to not 
employing a certain number of people. 
With city-regional strategic priorities more centrally prescribed and less locally inflected, 
the new enterprise policy approach has created a gap in the nature of support in that the LEP 
level initiatives are too narrowly focused on high-growth for smaller and micro-businesses to 
benefit from them. A supply-side mentality dominates the approach and contrasts with the 
realities in many constituent localities: 
‘Although we absolutely understand and know that growth has to be a priority, because of the make-
up of our economy we can’t just ignore the small to medium enterprises from a point of view of “If 
they don’t wish to tick a growth box we just ignore them; let them get on with it”, because all that 
will happen is there’ll be more dropping out the bottom than we’ll be putting back in the top.’ (CC) 
 The clash between national priorities and local realities casts doubt on the capacity of LEP 
to perform locally inflected roles as local business communities are underrepresented in the 
decision-making and approaches undertaken by LEPs. This can be attributed, at least in part, 
to the failure to enable local knowledge to transcend policy boundaries and filter into enterprise 
policy-making at the higher LEP-level, a key requirement of localised, place-based policy. As 
a local official emphasised: 
 I get the concept of regionally managed, because it saves money and that’s what we all need to do, 
but not necessarily then just press a button and everything falls down the same no matter where you 
are. Having that local knowledge is the bit that makes the difference.’ (S2) 
 Indeed, localism is premised on multi-actor collaboration and building on embedded local 
knowledge (Barca et al., 2012). As local actors possess critical knowledge and understanding 
of the local economy (Jackson et al., 2013), it is critical that that filters into policy initiatives 
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at higher scales. However, there is little evidence of this in the current enterprise policy-making 
context. 
Constrained local agency: localism and the illusion of power 
This section demonstrates why it is difficult for LEPs to deviate from a growth-centric 
enterprise policy narrative and highlights that, with economic growth given primacy over more 
democratically accountable strategies, “governance becomes a new site for conflicts” 
(Etherington and Jones, 2016, p.383). 
 As Pugalis and Townsend (2013, p.17) highlight, “the rules of the LEP game were set by 
central government”, questioning their operation as a bottom-up exercise and their 
effectiveness as instruments of multi-scalar policy feedback. The national policy framework’s 
influence through the vertical governance system over the focus and scope of the enterprise 
policy initiatives at the LEP level is reflected in the SEP which emphasises that “[t]he SCR 
will prioritise the most intensive support based on economic impact, focusing on the companies 
with the greatest growth potential” (SCR, 2014, p.35). Moreover, the strategy is wrapped 
around ‘What do we need to do to immediately start economic growth both with start-ups and 
existing businesses?’ (LEP), reflecting that what matters is ‘getting things done’ (Deas, 2014). 
This highlights the top-down pressure of national imperatives of job creation and economic 
growth. 
 Critically, the current arrangements provide little scope for enterprise policy to deviate 
from national priorities. Consistent with Tomaney (2016, p.5), the interviews highlight that 
entrepreneurship is “tolerated only within a highly restricted range of parameters”, with local 
actors under a constant pressure to conform to national priorities. With funding funnelled 
through LEPs, local authorities need to align themselves with the LEP in order to access 
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resources. A local official emphasised that ‘we’ve got to work very closely with [the LEP] and 
demonstrate that, if you invest in us, we’re able to turn that into jobs and economic growth’ 
(LC). This highlights the downward pressure on local actors to support the ‘LEP kind of 
growth’. Therefore, while central government is less involved in scripting the narrative, and 
while there is less direct influence on how growth is to be achieved, there is little scope in 
influencing what needs to be achieved. To reap the rewards, the local narrative must fit 
centrally prescribed priorities. 
 Nevertheless, the actors in a multi-scalar governance model pursue various, often 
competing interests and responsibilities and operate under different temporal horizons (Catney 
and Henneberry, 2016). Indeed, the interviews highlighted that some SCR localities have their 
own strategic partnerships looking to shape local strategy and policy. Doncaster, for example, 
has the ‘Team Doncaster’ Local Strategic Partnership formed by key local stakeholders “to set 
the strategic direction to effectively meet local needs and priorities for the further improvement 
of Doncaster” (Team Doncaster, 2015, no pagination). Its Borough Strategy report also 
emphasises that “no-one knows what Doncaster needs better than Doncaster itself” (DMBC, 
2014, p.10). Thus, local officials highlighted the duty of local authorities to ensure that 
economic priorities do not come at the expense of ‘good growth’ that is socially-inclusive, and 
‘the key challenge is ensuring that residents can benefit from all those areas of work and 
interventions’ (LC). Local authorities are therefore trying to deliver ‘the right kind of growth’ 
(Jackson et al., 2013), which requires a balance between growth-oriented and socially-inclusive 
objectives. 
Many local stakeholders emphasised that smaller businesses, be they growth-oriented or 
lifestyle, are critical in creating local job opportunities and alleviating deprivation: ‘There’s a 
lot of demand for lifestyle [businesses] and there’s nothing wrong with that because … we 
don’t want people on benefits … It’s something that we couldn’t ignore or play down because 
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it does have a positive impact on our economy’ (BDM). Inclusive business support provision 
can thus make an important socio-economic difference, but as a local official emphasised: 
‘Enterprise support … [needs to] hit all the people rather than just pre-filtered, pre-diagnosed, 
pre-grouped one or two’ (CC). Therefore, many local actors are struggling to maintain some 
form of local provision, thereby trying to articulate and establish their presence in a way that 
is not necessarily aligned with the strategic priorities determined at the LEP level for the entire 
SCR. 
 However, the heterogeneity of local priorities and needs and dwindling resources coupled 
with the inability of LEPs to adapt enterprise policy initiatives to local contexts creates tensions 
at the local level. As a local stakeholder explained, there is a constant struggle between doing 
what is right for the local business communities and what needs to be done to achieve city-
regional economic targets: 
‘Because of the devolution and the funding going through to the LEPs, we’ve got a situation 
where the LEPs have got targets and they’ve got priorities in terms of where they feel the 
agendas moving, but then we also have a responsibility locally to the business community 
and the politicians that we serve.’ (LS)  
 The constrained ability of local actors to influence the focus of enterprise policy at the LEP 
level means that the new localism is falling short of enabling localised, place-based enterprise 
policy-making. The difficulty in balancing social and economic priorities actually contrast with 
the characteristics of representative localism (Hildreth, 2011). This highlights the new localism 
as a continued form of conditional localism in which the scope for local agency and 
accountability is reduced, which creates tensions between city-regional and local actors. 
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 However, the new multi-scalar arrangements also see LEPs ‘bound up in a multi-scalar 
game of relationship jockeying’ (Jones, 2013, p.88) and increasingly stretched and as they are 
caught in-between local demands and the national agenda. A key issue contributing to this 
dynamic is central government’s lack of clarity regarding its normative expectations of the 
LEPs’ role (Pike et al., 2015). Highlighting continued central control, a LEP official explained: 
‘There is a constant shift in government requirements from Growth Hubs, which get pulled in 
every direction and are constantly asked to get involved in new initiatives’. This, coupled with 
little evidence of knowledge transfer amongst the actors involved in enterprise policy design 
and implementation and limited resources, reflects long-standing governance issues that 
previously also confronted RDAs (Arshed et al., 2016).  
 The current arrangements therefore foster the development of intrascalar tensions as LEPs 
face bottom-up pressures from local actors. Critically, with the power to develop localised, 
place-based enterprise policy existing only in rhetoric, the new localism is but an illusion (of 
power). The current multi-scalar arrangements have failed to galvanise local actors and provide 
a constructive framework for localised policy-making and place-based development (Barca et 
al., 2012; Arshed et al., 2016; Catney and Henneberry, 2016), thereby reducing the 
effectiveness of enterprise policy-making at the local level. 
Conclusions 
This paper explored the extent to which the new localism has effectively empowered LEPs and 
local communities to deliver localised, place-based enterprise policy-making through a focus 
on enterprise policy design and implementation at the subnational level. The experience of the 
SCR calls into question claims that contemporary enterprise policy enacted through LEPs has 
resulted in local empowerment and meaningfully place-sensitive policy. 
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 Research on the design and implementation of enterprise policy in the SCR LEP 
demonstrates constant tensions between national and local policy priorities that have skewed 
incentives away from locally suited solutions to generic growth-enhancing goals. While this 
study focuses on the SCR, there is reason to believe that other LEPs are also subject to similar 
tensions. First, while localities have been granted greater autonomy to shape their own 
economic narratives by forming LEPs, the significant reduction in public-sector expenditure 
has fundamentally constrained LEPs’ capacity for intervention and consequently their strategic 
approach. Devolved policies in the UK context are not judged on the needs of small and micro-
businesses in the region, but instead are measured for their effectiveness based on supporting 
HGP firms and achieving short-term economic goals aligned to central government priorities. 
As shown in the case of the SCR, this gives little consideration to local conditions and 
capabilities to support high-growth across heterogeneous constituent localities, confirming 
previous fears that LEPs will be unable to foster place-based development (Bentley et al., 2010; 
Arshed et al., 2016; Rossiter, 2016). A relevant issue here is the economic development context 
of LEPs. Given the variety of LEP types and the heterogeneity of economic conditions in each 
of them, some will be faced with greater economic development challenges than others. Those 
most in need of economic development, in particular, require place-sensitive economic 
strategies and enterprise policies tailored to the challenges facing their constituent localities. 
As such, focusing on HGP businesses is likely to be less of a priority, and thus less appropriate 
an objective, in places where lifestyle and smaller businesses prevail and start-ups survival 
rates are low, as is the case in the SCR. 
 However, this research identifies a pronounced rhetoric-reality gap. In the SCR, a focus on 
HGP firms in specific high-growth sectors squeezed local support for smaller and micro-
businesses that are much more prevalent in the local economy and are often more vulnerable 
and in need of support. The mismatches between rhetoric and reality, local and national, and 
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between the needs of high-growth businesses vis-à-vis the long tail of smaller and micro-
businesses, create lines of fissure that will have broader implications for economic and social 
resilience, debates around inclusive growth (Lee, 2019), and the devolution agenda in northern 
cities (Ayres et al., 2018). Critically, the challenges identified in the paper highlight that the 
new localism is illusory as the new arrangements have failed to empower local actors and the 
power to develop localised, place-based enterprise policy exists only in rhetoric. Instead, 
governance was transformed into a game of negotiating power and resources between and 
within governance scales, all within the confines of centrally prescribed priorities. Therefore, 
what the current arrangements have enabled is the delivery of local solutions to national 
problems, as opposed to local problems. As such, the paper demonstrates that the effectiveness 
of the enterprise policy-making process is also contingent on the way in which governance in 
structured. This is particularly relevant in the case of LEPs most in need of economic 
development like the SCR LEP. In light of the challenges highlighted in this paper, specifically 
the mismatch between local realities and national priorities as well as heterogeneous economic 
conditions requiring place-sensitive approaches to economic development, these are most 
likely to be let down by the new governance structures. 
 Characterising the English multi-scalar governance model as “both complex and deeply 
problematic”, Fenwick (2015, p.12) observes the absence of an institutional architecture of 
governance at the national level, the lack of a formal dimension of governance at the regional 
scale, and fragmented local governance. In this context, it is worth revisiting the debate on the 
‘missing middle’ (Shaw and Greenhalgh, 2010), specifically whether the city-region is indeed 
a more appropriate scale for policy integration and delivery than the region. Current debates 
playing out around a ‘One Yorkshire’ devolution deal confirm that the issue of scale is far from 
resolved. Two of the constituent local authorities have withdrawn from the SCR devolution 
deal, and two have withdrawn their support for it, which has further delayed the agreed deal. 
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Despite proclamations from all sides of the political debate and the formation of regionally 
focused political parties (Giovannini, 2016), the uncertainty over the current configuration of 
regional economic governance structures highlights the precarity of existing arrangements and 
the potential fault lines which may emerge. Such political wrangling further serves to 
destabilise the support of entrepreneurs in the region. 
 In this context, it is noteworthy to emphasise again that LEPs are specifically an English 
construct. Their formation is loosely situated within the wider UK devolution context, the 
origins of which is the late 1990s devolution of powers to Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales, and to RDAs in England. However, LEPs are a further development in England 
specifically, replacing the RDAs and often being much smaller in scale when compared to 
similar arrangements in the other nations of the UK. Therefore, the insights drawn from this 
case study of the SCR provide important policy lessons for enterprise policy-making and the 
future of UK devolution, not least in terms of the devolution of relevant powers, finances and 
the scale required for effectiveness. In particular, given that the fragmentation and rescaling of 
governance to the sub-regional scale in England has failed to deliver the promises of localism, 
it is questionable whether a similar approach to devolution is desirable or appropriate across 
the UK. 
 More importantly, given that the rescaling from regionalism to localism has failed to enable 
localised, place-based policy-making, an key question that arises is whether localism is about 
scale at all. Ultimately, what matters is the empowerment of local actors and communities to 
shape policy and adapt initiatives to local contexts, which means that localism can be seen as 
a socio-spatial construct that is nested within a complex mosaic of governance structures and 
politics. Therefore, an obsession with scale hampers a more meaningful reorganisation of 
economic development governance at the subnational level, one that places the values and 
objectives of localism, rather than scale, at its core. This is especially relevant in the context of 
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a shifting political landscape, married to sparse resources and competing demands, which has 
put significant stress on the ability of existing subregional governance structures to address 
wider regional inequalities. The public subsidisation of entrepreneurship alone has been 
insufficient to delivering the returns sought by both national and subregional level policies. 
Saddled with diminishing budgets and constrained resource, defining the place-specific 
policies needed to address the economic and social issues of the city-region will remain a 
significant challenge for LEPs if economic growth is narrowly conceived geographically and 
measured solely on making the peaks of HGFs higher. As this paper has indicated, it is 
important to identify how the rhetoric of localism is sensitive to the complexities and spiky 
geographies within city-regions alongside negotiating the widening gap between the economic 
power of London and the rest of the country. It is a challenge that has yet to be effectively met 
by regional-level policies in the UK. 
 While geographically localised given its focus on the SCR LEP, which limits the 
generalisability of the findings, this in-depth study of a city-region LEP provides rich insights 
into the governance dimension of enterprise policy-making and the importance of getting 
multi-scalar governance right, thus providing lessons relevant beyond the SCR context. Given 
the diverse geographies of LEPs, future research could explore the enterprise policy-making 
process in other contexts, such as non-city-region LEPs. It would be worthy to investigate 
whether the absence of a core-city makes any difference in coordinating competing local 
demands. In addition, the rescaling from RDAs to LEPs has resulted in new geographies of 
economic development governance. However, more needs to be understood about the 
dynamics between the actors involved in the enterprise policy-making process and why some 
LEPs are more successful in fostering multi-actor collaborations than other. Future studies 
could focus, for example, on whether LEPs’ identity, or lack thereof, plays a role in facilitating 
multi-actor relationships or exacerbating tensions between local actors. Finally, the findings in 
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this paper provide lessons for other LEP-type arrangements in other parts of the UK in 
particular within former manufacturing regions which have experienced economic 
restructuring such as in South Wales and central Scotland. As such, future studies could further 
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